

(b) (3) - P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

942011-1-1-0037

942031-1-2-0102

M = 417

1403

CATEGORY = 1

MESSAGE = 00734845

ZCZCRDR510 H GJJJJSSSSS

00

DE

F171 067233Z

ZKZK 00 HHA ZDI HRL DE

O 082330Z ZYH

FM USM 808

TO GOLF ELEVEN/PAPA USE 794B

ZEM

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

XXMM

ENP01FF108039 2/G11/VCM/T1973-69 RPT 2/G11/VCM/T1973-69 TACREP PASEP ADDEE (GOLF)
 ELEVEN/ECHO SONGBIRD (082155Z) AVC, AVN, ALS/HIGH-G-H-M/B, I, Z. VIETNAMESE (NORTH)
 PLAINTEXT UNIDENTIFIED REAR SERVICE ELEMENT OPERATING IN LAOS ISSUES SITUATION
 REPORT
 XXCC

FM? ((U/I RSE OPER IN LAOS)) TO? ((U/I RSE OPER IN LAOS)) DTI? ((08 MAR 69))
 ((M)) PREC? ----- NR? ((M)) CK? ((M)) ((CXNDM)) AT ((AND)) LOST SIGHT. THERE WAS
 NO LONGER THE SOUND OF A MOTOR. AFTER THAT THEY SAID IT WAS LESS THAN HALF A
 MINUTE AFTER THE SOUND OF THE EXPLOSION AND THE MOTOR HAD ECHOED AWAY
 COMPLETELY. THE PEOPLE WHO TOLD US THAT THIS PLANE WENT DOWN WERE CIVILIANS.
 ((WHEN)) I ASKED 2 CIVILIAN PROSLYTING COMRADES, THE 2 COMRADES DID NOT DARE
 ((CXNDM)) IS LIKE THAT ((CXNDM)) 7 OR UP TO 8 ((C-VAL)) KILOMETERS, THEN ACCORDING
 TO THE CIVILIANS, THEY SAID THAT IT IS POSSIBLE TO GO THERE BUT IT WOULD TAKE 4
 OR 5 DAYS. IT IS VERY DIFFICULT TO ENTER THIS AREA. THERE ARE ALSO SPECIAL
 FORCES. THERE IS NO WATER IN THIS AREA, AND ((WE MUST)) CARRY WATER FROM
 OUTSIDE, THEREFORE THE PROBLEM IS RELATIVELY COMPLICATED. YESTERDAY I SPOKE
 WITH SVOMRADE GOING TO SEARCH, BUT, PRESENTLY ((WE)) DO NOT YET HAVE THE
 REQUIREMENTS NECESSARY FOR ENTERING ((THE AREA)). AFTER THAT, AT 0400G IN THE
 MORNING, FROM 0230G TO 0500G, THERE WERE 2 AD6,S CIRCLING IN THE AREA OF THE
 WRECKAGE, AND AS FOR HELICOPTERS, THERE WERE NO SOUNDS OF MOTORS. THAT IS WHAT
 THE CIVILIANS SAID. ACCORDING TO OUR OPINIONS THE PILOTS WERE KILLED. I AM
 REPORTING THE ENEMY SITUATION. USUALLY IN THE MORNING, FROM ABOUT 0600G TO
 0700G, DURING THIS TIME, AND AT NOCTH THEY STRIKE STRONGLY ((C-VAL)) CAUSING
 VEHICLES TO BURN. AROUND THIS TIME ((THEY)) ARE ACTIVE RIGHT AT THE AREA. AT
 NIGHT THEY ARE STRONGLY ACTIVE, THAT IS TOWARDS MORNING. USUALLY FROM 1500G IN
 THE AFTERNOON TO 1700G IN THE AFTERNOON AROUND THIS TIME THEY ARE ATRONGLY
 ACTIVE ON INTO THE AFTERNOON, THAT IS ((THE SITUATION)) DURING THE DAY. AS FOR
 RECON- NAISSANCE SITUATION DURING THE DAY. ACTIVITY ARE INCREASED AT NIGHT,
 PRINCIPALLY CORNOR 19 ((2)), CORNER 20 ((2)) AND BA-KHE ((3)). THOSE ARE THE
 PRINCIPAL AREAS AT THIS PLACE. C-130,S USUALLY FLY AT AN ALTITUDE OF 2000 TO
 2500 ((METERS)) FIRING 20 MM ((CANNONS)), AND AS FOR B57,S AND F-4,S THERE IS
 USUALLY ONLY ONE F-4 ACCOMPANYING THESE C-130,S. WHEN WE FIRE UP ((AT THEM))
 THEN, THEY DIVE DOWN IN IMMEDIATE RESPONSE. EVERY TIME IS LIKE THAT, WE FIRE UP
 AND THEY COME DOWN IN RESPONSE. AT THE SAME TIME THEY ALSO STRIKE THE ROAD IN
 ORDER TO ((C-VAL)) STRIKE VEHICLES, THAT IS THE ENEMY SITUATION. AS FOR TIMES,
 AT NIGHT ((THEY ARE ACTIVE)) DURING THE EVENING FROM 1900G TO 2100G, AND AT
 NIGHT FROM 0100G UNTIL MORNING THEY ARE ALSO USUALLY ACTIVE IN MEETING THE
 VEHICLES OF OUR PLATON. THAT IS THE SITUATION OF ACTIVITIES AT NIGHT. IN
 RELATION TO THE UNIT HERE THE SITUATION OF THE POSITION IS RELATIVELY
 COMPLICATED. PRESENTLY THE ENEMY HAVE AGAIN STRUCK THE 2 NEWLY DUG POSITIONS. 1

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

Poss. 9 MAR 69

1403 O-2A

R.F. REX BB

T.L. WALTERS BB

~~SECRET SPOKE~~

POSITION APPEARS TO BE USUABLE BECAUSE HIGH EXPLOSIVE BOMBS HAVE BLOCKED THE GUN CREW ((ENPLACEMENTS)), AND ONE POSITION WAS HIT WITH A BUNDLE OF CLUSTER BOMBS. THIS POSITION IS STILL USABLE BUT IS NEARLY COVERED. THAT IS THE SITUATION OF ALL THE PROBLEMS. PRESENTLY ((WE)) ARE STILL OCCUPYING KILOMETER 61 ((2)) WITH 3 WEAPONS ((AND TWO WEAPONS FOUGHT DURING THE NIGHT, MY JUDGEMENT ABOUT THE C-130,S AND F-4,S IS THAT THE F-3 IS THE ANTIAIRCRAFT ELEMENT WHICH IS ESSENTIAL BUT WHEN THERE WERE 2 TO 3 OTHER PLANES, AT THAT MOMENT THE ENEMY WAS CONCENTRATING TO STRIKE AND BLOCK THE VEHICLES, BUT, AT THE SAME TIME TO RESPOND TO OUR POSITIONS, THAT IS TO STRIKE VEHICLES BUT AT THE SAME TIME TO STRIKE POSITIONS. GENERALLY SPEAKING MY WORK IS ALMOST FINISHED. THERE REMAINS ONLY THE PROBLEM OF STRIKING THE ENEMY ((WHEN THEY)) LAND ((FROM)) THE AIRWAYS, ((WHICH)) I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO PROPAGATE, AND IN THE OPINION OF COMRADE BIEU ((1)) ((BIEEUR)), IT IS TO ORGANIZE TRAINING FOR THE TROOPS IN SHORT METHODS TO STRIKE THE ENEMY ((WHEN THEY)) LAND ((FROM)) THE AIRWAYS, THAT IS TO TRAIN INFANTRY. I HAVE NOT YET BEEN ABLE TO ((START)) THE TRAINING BECAUSE THEY ARE CONTINUALLY DIGGING FORTIFICATIONS. ((1)) U/I PERSONALITY ((3)) UNLOCATED ((3)) POSS REFERENCE TO WD 918 081 OR WD 930 019 MS? [REDACTED] TI? 020058ZMR9 CN? [REDACTED] FM? ----- TO? SOONG-HOONGF (EQ? 46.000 MHZ) XXHH 900 RNNHC

(b) (1)

(b) (1)(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)(b) (3)USC 403

(b) (3)-50 USC 403

(b) (3)-P.L. 86-36

~~SECRET SPOKE~~